This is the second part to Todd Kenyon's article on Warren Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway, and his attempt at putting an intrinsic value on the behemoth company.

Right off the bat Buffett comments on the credit debacle:

"Some major financial institutions have, however, experienced staggering problems because they engaged in the "weakened lending practices" I described in last year's letter. John Stumpf, CEO of Wells Fargo, aptly dissected the recent behavior of many lenders: "It is interesting that the industry has invented new ways to lose money when the old ways seemed to work just fine.""

To this I would say while the techniques may have been new, the underlying driver is the same as always: GREED, fueled by flawed incentive structures. See my post on lollapalooza effects here for more on this...

Buffett reiterates his definition of a good business in a section entitled "Businesses - the Great, the Good, and the Gruesome"...

He states that businesses which require ongoing capital input can be good businesses, assuming the return on that capital is attractive. Here he uses Flight Safety (Berkshires pilot training business,- Buffett quips that "Going to any other flight-training provider than the best is like taking the low bid on a surgical procedure") as an example - a business with a solid moat but one that requires continuous capital input...

Buffett uses the airline industry as an example of a "gruesome" business: one that requires tons of capital yet generates no return. As he has stated before, "Indeed, if a farsighted capitalist had been present at Kitty Hawk, he would have done his successors a huge favor by shooting Orville down".

He sums it all up with the following simple analogy:

"think of three types of "savings accounts." The great one pays an extraordinarily high interest rate that will rise as the years pass. The good one pays an attractive rate of interest that will be earned also on deposits that are added. Finally, the gruesome account both pays an inadequate interest rate and requires you to keep adding money at those disappointing returns."

Buffett is happy about the performance of Berkshire's equity holdings in 2007. He states:

"I should emphasize that we do not measure the progress of our investments by what their market prices do during any given year. Rather, we evaluate their performance by the two methods we apply to the businesses we own. The first test is improvement in earnings, with our making due allowance for industry conditions. The second test, more subjective, is whether their "moats" - a metaphor for the superiorities they possess that make life difficult for their competitors - have widened during the year. All of the "big four" (AXP, KO, WFC, PG) scored positively on that test."

He also advised that if you worry a lot about the stock market on any given day, you shouldn't buy stocks.

So, what about Berkshire's intrinsic value?

I previously wrote about this topic here and outlined my methods. IV hasn't changed much since then: for the book value method I get $158,000 for A shares ($5267 for B shares), while the float method spits out about $160,000 ($5333 for B shares). Hence, the stock is trading at a modest discount of about 12% to these estimates. I continue to hold it in many of my managed accounts, but will wait for lower prices to add more.

All commentary is that of Todd Kenyon. I have merely summarized parts of his blog.